Posts Tagged ‘Digital Signatures’
How Counterfeit Avastin Penetrated the U.S. Supply Chain
The internet lit up last week when the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) posted an announcement that they are aware of counterfeit Avastin in the U.S. pharmaceutical supply chain (see “Counterfeit Version of Avastin in U.S. Distribution” on the FDA website and Genentech’s announcement).
I found out about it when I received notice of Dr. Adam Fein’s (PhD) excellent blog posting “Greedy Physicians Invite Fake Avastin Into the Supply Chain” on his DrugChannels.net blog, but multiple national news agencies picked the story up and many articles were written about it. Most simply reflected the contents in the FDA’s announcement.
But at least one news source seemed to do some additional investigating. Bill Berkrot and John Acher of Reuters published the excellent article “Fake Avastin’s path to U.S. traced to Egypt” on Thursday. In the article they provide a little more background on the path the drugs allegedly took before apparently arriving on the shelves of U.S. physicians and potentially in the bodies of unsuspecting U.S. patients.
And Pharmaceutical Commerce Online reports that Avastin isn’t the only incident of recent counterfeit injectable cancer drugs making it into the U.S. market that the FDA is currently investigating.
HOW COUNTERFEIT AVASTIN MADE IT INTO THE LEGITIMATE U.S. SUPPLY CHAIN
Now keep in mind, this is only investigative journalism so far, and while the information source listed in the Reuters article is the Danish Medicines Agency, criminal investigators may already know more than this and in the end, some or all of the contents of the Reuters article may eventually be found to be untrue. Whether ultimately true or not Read the rest of this entry »
Why GS1 EPCIS Alone Won’t Work For California Pedigree, Part 2
There are more than one reasons why you shouldn’t expect to use GS1’s EPCIS by itself to comply with the California pedigree law. Part 1 of this series showed that the traditional distributed network of EPCIS repositories in the U.S. pharma supply chain doesn’t work. But that analysis assumed the use of the “vanilla” EPCIS standard, without the use of any “extensions”. That’s not really the way GS1 intended EPCIS to be used. In this and future essays of this series I will explore some of the approaches that make full use of the extensibility that is built into the standard.
In this Part of the series I want to take a closer look at the work of the Network Centric ePedigree work group of the GS1 Healthcare Traceability group. I am one of the leaders of that group along with Dr. Mark Harrison of the Cambridge University AutoId Lab, Dr. Ken Traub, Independent Consultant, and Gena Morgan of GS1, along with strong contributions from Janice Kite of GS1 and Dr. Dale Moberg of Axway. The larger group consists of people who work for companies in the pharmaceutical supply chain, GS1, and solution providers from around the globe, although I think the majority are from the U.S.
The NCeP group published a very interesting recording of a presentation that explains the details of their work. It is called “NCeP – Technical Analysis Sub-Group, Event Based Pedigree”. The purpose of this recording is to help people outside of the close-knit NCeP group to learn about the pedigree models developed there, evaluate them and provide feedback to the group about which model(s) should be Read the rest of this entry »
Inspecting An Electronic Pedigree
Within conversations held during the development of standards for electronic pedigrees it is sometimes common to hear people apply the following test to any pedigree proposal:
“A state inspector arrives at your facility without prior warning, enters the warehouse, picks up any random package of drugs and asks to see ‘the pedigree’ for this package.”
The point being made is that, according to the California Pedigree Law, at the very least, supply chain members will need to be capable of producing a full pedigree for any and every package of drugs in their possession at any time in case of a surprise inspection.
This scenario is an important one when selecting a pedigree model, but it often causes me to think about exactly what the company being inspected would show the inspector, and how they would do that. Read the rest of this entry »
U.S. Pharma Supply Chain Complexity

© Copyright 2011 Duncan Champney. used with Permission. This image was created with FractalWorks, a high performance fractal renderer for Macintosh computers. FractalWorks is available on the Mac App Store (Click on image).
The debate over pedigree regulatory models in the U.S. pharmaceutical supply chain often centers around how much data for each package of drugs needs to be moved between trading partners as those drugs move down the supply chain from the manufacturer to distributor(s) and ultimately to the pharmacy. The ideal model would minimize the amount of data moved yet always allow each member of the supply chain to check the prior history—the pedigree—of the drugs they are about to buy.
At a superficial level this appears to be all you need to do, but when you take a closer at the details of how the supply chain actually works in the U.S. you will see that there are other characteristics besides data volume per package that need to be considered.
FOUR VIEWS OF THE U.S. SUPPLY CHAIN
In the debates and discussions over pedigree regulatory models we are used to seeing a view of the supply chain that shows one manufacturer, one distributor and one pharmacy. That view masks so much important complexity that if we were to select a regulatory model or solution based on that view it would be far from ideal.
Here is a view of the supply chain where the vertical scale shows something closer to the true proportions between those three segments. Read the rest of this entry »
Electronic Message Security and More on Certifications
Digital electronic messages can be transmitted from one party to another using a wide range of communications technologies. Today, businesses that make use of the internet to transmit their business messages to and from their trading partners make use of standards-based Electronic Data Interchange (EDI) message formatting.
EDI messages are typically transmitted point-to-point, from one business to one other business. There are a large number of EDI message types defined but in the pharmaceutical supply chain the most common messages are purchase orders, purchase order acknowledgments, invoices and advance shipment notices (ASN’s). (While I have the chance, I’d like to point out that ASN’s are not pedigrees for multiple reasons that I will not cover in this essay.)
In the U.S. pharma supply chain AS2 is the most common communications protocol in use for EDI message exchange. AS2 provides generalized message security to ensure that the messages cannot be understood or tampered with by unauthorized parties during movement from sender to recipient. According to Wikipedia, these are achieved through the use of digital certificates and encryption. Messages can optionally be digitally signed by the sender to provide non-repudiation within the AS2 payload context.
Electronic pedigrees as defined by the states of Florida and California are messages that contain fairly complex legal documentation which describe the chain of custody or ownership of a given package of drugs, but they also contain several types of legally required certifications. Read the rest of this entry »
Certifications In A California-Compliant Drug Pedigree
I’ve been involved in a number of conversations lately that included differing opinions about what will be necessary to “certify” a drug pedigree in California after their pedigree law goes into effect (2015-2017, depending on your role in the supply chain). It’s a contentious issue, especially for those who wish that a distributed pedigree model would comply.
The California Law is fairly clear that the pedigree must contain, “A certification under penalty of perjury from a responsible party of the source of the dangerous drug that the information contained in the pedigree is true and accurate.” And that, among a list of other things, it must include “…the name and address of each person certifying delivery or receipt of the dangerous drug.”
In the California language, a “dangerous drug” is Read the rest of this entry »

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