Posts Tagged ‘distributed pedigree’

© Copyright 2011 Duncan Champney. used with Permission. This image was created with FractalWorks, a high performance fractal renderer for Macintosh computers. FractalWorks is available on the Mac App Store (Click on image).

The debate over pedigree regulatory models in the U.S. pharmaceutical supply chain often centers around how much data for each package of drugs needs to be moved between trading partners as those drugs move down the supply chain from the manufacturer to distributor(s) and ultimately to the pharmacy.  The ideal model would minimize the amount of data moved yet always allow each member of the supply chain to check the prior history—the pedigree—of the drugs they are about to buy.

At a superficial level this appears to be all you need to do, but when you take a closer at the details of how the supply chain actually works in the U.S. you will see that there are other characteristics besides data volume per package that need to be considered.

FOUR VIEWS OF THE U.S. SUPPLY CHAIN

In the debates and discussions over pedigree regulatory models we are used to seeing a view of the supply chain that shows one manufacturer, one distributor and one pharmacy.  That view masks so much important complexity that if we were to select a regulatory model or solution based on that view it would be far from ideal.

Here is a view of the supply chain where the vertical scale shows something closer to the true proportions between those three segments. Read the rest of this entry »

At the end of my last essay I said I had recently concluded that the jump to a fully automated pharma supply chain upstream visibility system is too big and complex to be achievable by every company in the U.S. supply chain by the California dates.  I want to explain that statement in a future essay (soon), but before I do I want to explore some of the track and trace models that are being considered by both GS1 and the FDA.  I particularly want to look at the viability of each model because I think we will find that some just aren’t (viable), and that will help narrow the search.

I’ll look at the three basic models that the FDA mentioned in their recent workshop:  Centralized, Semi-Centralized and Distributed (or Decentralized as the FDA called it).  There are others, but it seems that they can all be either based on, or reduced to, one of these three basic models.

In this essay I am looking at track & trace models from a global viewpoint, which is something that GS1 is doing but the FDA may not.  Attacks on the pharma supply chain are a global problem and global problems demand global solutions or gaps will be left for criminals to exploit.

GS1′s goal is to develop standards that apply globally as much as possible and the FDA will likely find that Read the rest of this entry »

I’ve been involved in a number of conversations lately that included differing opinions about what will be necessary to “certify” a drug pedigree in California after their pedigree law goes into effect (2015-2017, depending on your role in the supply chain).  It’s a contentious issue, especially for those who wish that a distributed pedigree model would comply. 

The California Law is fairly clear that the pedigree must contain, “A certification under penalty of perjury from a responsible party of the source of the dangerous drug that the information contained in the pedigree is true and accurate.”  And that, among a list of other things, it must include “…the name and address of each person certifying delivery or receipt of the dangerous drug.”

In the California language, a “dangerous drug” is Read the rest of this entry »

GS1 US is dedicated to expanding the adoption of GS1 Global’s standards for supply chain interaction in the U.S. market.  Almost every country in the world has a GS1 “Member Organization” (M.O.) that is dedicated to the same thing within their borders.  With the local M.O.’s primary focus on driving adoption, their most valuable tool is that country’s government.  If they can get the government to reference GS1 standards in their laws, their work is much easier. 

This isn’t unique to GS1, or course.  All standards organizations know this and they all have various approaches to getting the attention of each country’s government.  There is nothing wrong with this.  In fact, it makes perfect sense since, unlike standards organizations themselves, countries always have very large enforcement wings.

But what happens when those governments are too big to sway easily?  What if it costs too much and takes too long to get them to see the light?  This is when a standards adoption organization needs to get creative.  In my opinion, that’s what has led GS1 Healthcare US to create the “2015 Readiness Program”.  It was out of frustration with the California State Government and with the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) and their, so far, unwillingness to create laws and regulations that mandate the use of GS1 standards.  Let me explain. Read the rest of this entry »

Four years ago the GS1 EPCglobal Software Action Group (SAG) Drug Pedigree Messaging Work Group was wrapping up the standard specification for the GS1 Drug Pedigree Messaging Standard (DPMS, aka GS1 Pedigree Ratified Standard).  That standard was developed through collaboration between U.S. pharmaceutical supply chain members, industry associations, solution providers and GS1.  DPMS 1.0 was ratified by the EPCglobal Board in early January 2007.

DPMS has many benefits.  It results in a self-contained, self-secure electronic document that clearly shows the chain of ownership and/or custody of a given drug package (or a set of packages if they all have the same history).  It works equally well with serialized and non-serialized products.  The security of DMPS documents comes from within the electronic documents themselves rather than just from a security layer wrapped around a given server.  A self-contained, self-secure document model should work well as evidence in a criminal trial.

But even before DPMS was ratified people were raising questions and concerns about it.  Those concerns were Read the rest of this entry »

“…[C]ommencing on July 1, 2016, a wholesaler or repackager may not sell, trade, or transfer a [prescription] drug at wholesale without providing a pedigree.

…[C]ommencing on July 1, 2016, a wholesaler or repackager may not acquire a [prescription] drug without receiving a pedigree.

…[C]ommencing on July 1, 2017, a pharmacy may not sell, trade, or transfer a [prescription] drug at wholesale without providing a pedigree.

…[C]ommencing on July 1, 2017, a pharmacy may not acquire a [prescription] drug without receiving a pedigree.”

With these words the State of California introduced a significant change to the way the pharmaceutical supply chain works (see section 4163 of the California Business and Professions Code) and has written a new page in the history of commerce.  It brings pharmaceutical commerce fully into the computer age.  Adam Smith would not recognize it.  Today, and up to the effective dates of these provisions, the value of a legitimate pharmaceutical in the legitimate U.S. supply chain is determined by the physical condition of the product and its package.  After July 1, 2016, the value of a legitimate pharmaceutical in the supply chain in California will be determined by the combination of the physical condition of the product and its package, and the sellers ability to provide the buyer with an electronic pedigree. 

The intended effect of this new regulatory requirement is to place a significant roadblock in front of counterfeiters, diverters and others who would try to scam patients and the legitimate participants in the supply chain.  This is a noble cause.  By requiring sellers to provide buyers with a pedigree at each change in ownership in the supply chain, illegitimate parties will find it very hard to inject illegitimate drugs without exposing their actions and, at the same time, creating evidence that can be used against them in their own prosecution.  By providing a pedigree at each change in ownership, supply chain buyers will be able to check the authenticity of the full supply chain transaction history provided by the seller, maximizing the likelihood that any suspicious activity would be detected long before a patient would receive the drugs.

But I’m more interested today in exploring a surprising unintended effect of these requirements.  I’ve touched on this briefly in past essays but I’ve recently concluded that the implications of these requirements are much more significant than I realized before.  This may be the first time in the history of commerce that Read the rest of this entry »